Vatanka Reports
News and Analysis on the Greater Middle East 
 

Any Iranian effort to work toward a new nuclear deal without adjusting its regional policies risks meeting the same fate as the 2015 agreement. Significant relief from sanctions requires an Iranian-American process of détente that cannot be limited to the nuclear file. And herein lies Pezeshkian’s — and Khamenei’s — fundamental test.

If the foreign policy rhetoric of Iran’s new president, Masoud Pezeshkian, leaves you bewildered, you’re not alone. Pezeshkian ran as a candidate who promised fundamental change, but in his first few weeks in office, he has under-delivered, to put it mildly.

This new president’s promise to focus on regional de-escalation and cooperation — and not prioritize a quick dash for a new nuclear deal with the West — should be encouraged for one principal reason: de-escalation with the Arab world can provide a pathway for Tehran to climb down from its regional agenda and its stance toward Israel.

The supporters of the two candidates left in the race, Masoud Pezeshkian from the reformist-moderate camp and Saeed Jalili from the ultra-hardline camp, are scrambling to create voter excitement. Speaking on July 3, Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, called the runoff a litmus test for the regime and its integrity.

With just a few days left before Iranians head to the polls, it is clear that the June 28 presidential election is not exciting the country’s voters. After several televised debates, some of which have been mildly contentious, the six men in the race — the only candidates approved by the Guardian Council — have failed to energize the public.

Now that the gloves are off, Iran and Israel cannot go back to the era of “shadow war.” Still, on the Iranian side, it is the first time since the launch of the “Axis of Resistance” some 20 years ago that Tehran has to choose whether it wants to center its entire national security strategy around the conflict with Israel.

The tit-for-tat attacks between Israel and Iran over the last month were a watershed moment for the Iranian regime, representing the biggest test of the Islamic Republic’s ideological foreign policy agenda since the 1979 revolution.

Iran is a key stakeholder in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Tehran does not have a deciding vote on the outcome of the current war in Gaza, but it does have plenty of capacity to shape the future course of the conflict. Iran is, after all, among the top backers of Hamas, both in terms of diplomatic support and as a supplier of military materiel and knowhow.

Iran considers Bahraini foreign policy to be extensively shaped by Saudi Arabia. Tehran’s approach toward Bahrain is, therefore, very much linked to its overall interest in reducing tensions with Riyadh. At the moment, those considerations trump any interest Tehran has in backing Bahraini Shi’a Islamists who historically have looked to Iran for patronage.

The March 1st elections in Iran present a mere illusion of democracy tightly orchestrated by Khamenei, sidelining crucial figures amidst a legitimacy crisis and growing public disenchantment.

The Iranian regime’s links to the Houthis predate the Yemeni civil war that erupted in 2014, but there is no doubt that relations have deepened in a strategic sense over the course of the last decade.

Leaders in Tehran can either seize the diplomatic opportunity—or face a potential threat to their own power.