Vatanka Reports
News and Analysis on the Greater Middle East 
 

Iran is a key stakeholder in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Tehran does not have a deciding vote on the outcome of the current war in Gaza, but it does have plenty of capacity to shape the future course of the conflict. Iran is, after all, among the top backers of Hamas, both in terms of diplomatic support and as a supplier of military materiel and knowhow.

Iran considers Bahraini foreign policy to be extensively shaped by Saudi Arabia. Tehran’s approach toward Bahrain is, therefore, very much linked to its overall interest in reducing tensions with Riyadh. At the moment, those considerations trump any interest Tehran has in backing Bahraini Shi’a Islamists who historically have looked to Iran for patronage.

The March 1st elections in Iran present a mere illusion of democracy tightly orchestrated by Khamenei, sidelining crucial figures amidst a legitimacy crisis and growing public disenchantment.

The Iranian regime’s links to the Houthis predate the Yemeni civil war that erupted in 2014, but there is no doubt that relations have deepened in a strategic sense over the course of the last decade.

Leaders in Tehran can either seize the diplomatic opportunity—or face a potential threat to their own power.

As the war rages on between Israel and Hamas in Gaza, the role of Iran will remain a central factor. Tehran is not only Israel’s top regional foe but also the leading provider of military aid and training for Hamas.

Two days after the Hamas attack on Israel last weekend, a top Iranian official said that “Arab states willing to normalize relations with Israel [should] give up the process and learn a lesson from the latest developments in Palestine.”

History might very well show that the people’s protests that broke out in September 2022 in Iran were the final opportunity for the Islamist regime to change political course. But as the past year has made clear, the regime in Tehran utterly failed to seize the moment.

Heightened great power competition is allowing nations to make deals in their own best interests.

Iran is possibly the only country that the United Arab Emirates can call an “enemy.” Yet there is another more significant and multilayered side to the UAE-Iran relationship, one that concepts such as political pragmatism or hedging alone cannot explain.

Late last month, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei opted to replace the secretary of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), Ali Shamkhani.

One of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s special envoys keeps visiting Iran. Igor Levitin, Putin’s advisor, has visited Tehran twice in 2023, totaling five visits in the last six months.